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Prefatory Note

James H. Hutson's detailed study based on extensive archival research touches on many
subjects. His essay highlights the terrors of war, ever more obliterating the di~tinction between
combatants and civilians; the hazards of a new military technology being tested in combat;
human proneness to error, especially under dire circumstances of danger-filled warfare; the
diplomatic relations between an emerging superpower and a small neutral European nation; and,
finally, the impact of a perceived parallel heritage as crystallized in the metaphor 'Sister
Republics.' James H. Hutson's sensitive and scholarly exploration of a facet of World War II
adds significantly to his previous work, The Sister Republics. Switzerland and the United States
1776 to the Present (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 1991). Since smaller nations

are mostly ignored in the study of European and American history, his essay is especially
welcome and appreciated.
Natalie Hector has been of invaluable help in preparing the essay for the Review and
patiently put up with the numerous queries and necessary changes. As always, I am very much
obliged to her expertise.

Leo Schelbert, &litor
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BOMBING TIIE SISTER REPUBLIC: TIIE UNITED STATES
AND SWITZERLAND DURING WORLD WAR Il

James H. Hutson

At 11:10 A.M., April 1, 1944, American military authorities in London received the
following "strike message" from aircraft attacking a target in Europe: "392 Group bombed Last
Resort with poor results at 10:50 hours. "1 This terse communication described the "gravest
violation "2 of Swiss neutrality during the Second World War--in fact, during the entire twentieth
century: the bombing of the city of Schafthausen by planes of the 2nd Division of the American
8th Army Air Force.
The weather in Schafthausen on Saturday morning, April 1, was good, but not perfect.
A newspaper reported that the city enjoyed a "sunny, clear spring day. "3 Mayor Walther
Bringolf called the weather "leicht bewolkt. "4 An eyewitness, who described the raid in a
Zurich newspaper, wrote of the American bombers emerging from clouds.5 The attacking

1

Eighth Air Force records, Center for Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base,
Washington, D.C. The records at Bolling Air Force Base are microfilm copies of the original ·
records at The Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery,
Alabama. The microfilm reels consulted at Bolling Air Force Base were 520.331, 520.332,
526.331, 526.332, and BO 445. G.P. 392.
2

National Zeitung (Basel), April 3, 1944.

3

lbid.

4

Walther Bringolf, Mein Leben. Weg und Umweg eines Schweizer Sozialdemokraten (Bern,
1964), 340: "slightly overcast"; "Dennoch gelang es mir, ... einen Blick ... auf den leicht
bewolkten Himmel zu werfen" (340-341).
5

Neue Zurcher Zeitung, April 3, 1944.
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American pilots reported to their superiors that Schaftbausen was "5/10" covered with _clouds, 6
a description supported by photographs taken by American bombers as they flew over the city. 7
At 10:00 a.m. German radio, received throughout the city, reported the presence of
enemy aircraft near the border between the Third Reich and northeastern Switzerland. Shortly
after 10: 15 a.m. the roar of engines. was heard over certain parts of Schaftbausen. At 10:39
a. m. sirens began sounding in the city. Because of the continual violation of Swiss air space by
Allied and Axi~ planes, air raid sirens had become a fixture in Swiss life by the spring of 1944.
As a result of the "monotony of almost daily alarms," a Basel newspaper reported on April 3,
. "the population in large areas of the country paid hardly any attention to them. "8
What the Basel newspaper meant was that the Swiss had ceased to respect the sirens as
harbingers of possible harm. Complacency in Schaftbausen began from the top down, for the
City Council, meeting on April 1 in a Saturday morning session, ignored the sirens and
continued to work through its agenda. 9 It was also business as usual at Schaftbausen' s weekly
open-air market near the railroad station where operations proceeded in "full swing," as the
sirens sounded. 10 Citizens continued to stroll along the streets. Some curious homeowners
threw their windows open and scanned the skies to see what was happening above the city. A
businessman described running into the street when he heard the sound of airplane engines. As
the planes flew over, they dropped red flares, causing the businessman to linger in the street to

6

ReportofLead Bombardier (Joseph Whittaker), 392nd Bombardment Group, April 1, 1944,
reel 526.332, Bolling AFB.
7

See Ursel P. Harvell, Liberators over Europe. 44th Bombardment Group (San Angelo,
Texas, 1949), unpaginated.
8

National Zeitung, April 3, 1944.

9Mayor Bringolf reported that at the sound of the sirens he briefly adjourned the council
meeting, went to the window, and scanned the skies. Seeing a smoke signal, Bringolf assumed
that it indicated that Swiss fighters were attempting to intercept intruding aircraft. No sooner
had the council resumed its deliberations than bombs began falling in the streets around the city
hall. Bringolf, note 4, above, 340-1.
10

New York Times, April 2, 1944.
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see what would happen next. Suddenly, a violent explosion shook the neighborhood. Thrown
through the air and temporarily knocked unconscious, the businessman came to his senses and
saw the body of an acquaintance with its head and right shoulder blown off.11 The decapitated
corpse was gruesome testimony to the meaning of the flares: they were signals to the bombers
to drop their payloads on Schaffhausen.
The bombing of Schaffhausen, carried out by American B-24 Liberators, lasted thirty to
forty seconds. The target of the American planes was Schaffhausens's Altstadt [the city's old
section], an area in the south central part of the city, along the Rhine River, that contained the
Swiss National Railroad station, government buildings, museums, churches, quaint houses, and
the Miihlenenquartier, "the old industrial area of the city." The railroad station took a direct
hit, which killed sixteen people. A bomb that fell near the court house ripped up heavy.paving
stones and propelled them through the air, killing ten. 12 In a report to the Schaffhausen City
Council, April 12, 1944, Mayor Walther Bringolf stated that the Americans had killed thirtynine people, a figure later revised to forty; thirty-three remained in the hospital, some with
potentially fatal wounds. 13 The dead were a cross-section of Schaffhausen' s population--a city
councilman, a cantonal judge, a chef, craftsmen, laborers, women, and children.
The mayor reported that scores of dwellings were destroyed, leaving 428 people ·
homeless.
Seventeen factories and businesses were wrecked, throwing two hundred people-..,
some estimates ran as high as one thousand--out of work. The city's cultural patrimony suffered
irreplaceable losses, for the American bombers destroyed a wing of the Allerheiligen Museum
which contained the priceless paintings of the city's foremost artist, the sixteenth-century painter,
Tobias Stimmer ( 1539-1584) .14 Providentially, Stimmer' s portrait of the Zurich naturalist,

11

Basler Nachrichten, April 3, 1944.

12

Bringolr s report to the Schaffhausen City Council, April 12, is printed in the Neue Zurcher

Zeitung, April 13, 1944.
13

A total of 270 people suffer~ wounds of varying degrees of severity.
Schiendorfer, SchajJha.user Nachrichten, March 31, 1944.

Andreas

14

Max Bendel, ZerstlJner Schafjha,user Kunstbesitz (Zurich, 1944).
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Konrad Gessner (1516-1565), one of the first Swiss to study the Americas, miraculously
survived the bombing, having been blown into the street and retrieved there relatively unharmed.
Not so fortunate was Lucas Cranach's famous painting of Martin Luther, which was destroyed
by the fire. The catastrophe at Allerheiligen alarmed museum directors across Switzerland,
some of whoJT, hastily removed their treasures from public galleries and put them in
safekeeping. 15
Officials and citizens of Schaffhausen were widely admired for their response to the
bombing. 16 There was no panic: discipline, ingenuity, and public spiritedness prevailed.
Having lost telephone service, the city administration dispatched town criers and citizens with
handwritten signs to instruct their fellow citizens to report to emergency duty stations.
Firefighting assistance was requested by telegraph and within an hour of the 10:50.a.m. attack ·
an "unbroken line" of fire trucks from Zurich, Winterthur, St. Gallen and points-in-between
were streaming into the burning city. 17 By 2:00 p.m. the largest fires were "isolated;" by 4:30
p.m. all fires were under control; and by 6:00 p.~. the visiting firefighters were preparing to
return to their hometowns. To protect inhabitants and visitors from the danger of collapsing
buildings and delayed action bombs, federal authorities closed Schaffhausen to most outside
traffic until April 10, at which point life in the city began to regain some of its normal rhythm.
Assessing his city's response to the attack, Mayor Bringolf on April 12, 1944,
recommended improvements in its civil defense operations: air raid shelters needed to be more
clearly designated and they needed to be stocked with more and better first aid supplies.
Although the advice may have seemed gratuitous, Bringolf urged the citizens to pay more

15

As did officials at the Kunstmuseum in Basel. Nationa,l Zeitung, April 5, 1944.

16

For a vivid account of the impact of the bombing on one Swiss family and for the
resilience of the citizens of Schaffhausen, see Peter Vogelsanger, Mit Leib und Seele. Erlebnisse
und Einsichten eines Pfarrers (Zurich, 1977), 196-9.
11

Neue Zurcher Zeitung, April 3, 1944.
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attention to air raid alarms in the future. 18 This became a common theme across Switzerland,
as newspapers and public officials lectured the people of their locality about the "lessons" of
Schaftbausen. Although the citizens of Schaftbausen were regarded as objects of compassion
not reproach, a Zurich newspaper, Die Tat, estimated that few lives would have been lost in the
city . had proper civil defense procedures been followed.

Writing in Volk und Annee,

Schaffhausen's best-known soldier, Colonel Oscar Frey, calculated that one-third of the
casualties in his hometown could have been avoided by a responsible reaction to the air raid
warnings. 19 Especially distressing to Colonel Frey were the deaths of those people sucked
through the open windows of the upper stories of houses by the turbulent air pressure created
by the explosion of the American bombs. If it did nothing else, Schaffhausen transformed the
detached attitude ("Zaungast Mentalitat")20 of the Swiss towards civil defense into anxious
anxiety.
American newspapermen, who reached Schaftbausen on S~turday afternoon, April 1,
while the fires were still blazing in the city, were amazed at the self-restraint of the local
population. Thomas Hawkins of the Associated Press reported that the "Townspeople with
whom I talked expressed grief at the casualties and regret at the loss of old buildings but showed
no anger saying simply they hoped it would not happen again. "21 A United Press dispatch,
filed from Schaftbausen on April 1, marvelled at the "stoic calm" of the suffering city. "There
are no hard feelings toward the United States. Americans were being treated with the utmost
politeness and friendliness by police, military authorities and the population. "22
18

Pastor Vogelsanger relates an anecdote to demonstrate Schaftbausen' s sudden respect for
air raid sirens. A confirmation service over which he was officiating on April 2 was
"interrupted by a new air raid alarm. While earlier one had paid little attention to these alarms,
now we fled at the first sign to a large nearby shelter and there I continued with the ceremony.
It was the most impressive confirmation service that I had ever experienced .... " Ibid., 201.
19

Frey's article was reprinted in Der Bund (Bern), April 12, 1944.

20

Neue Zurcher Zeitung, April 3, 1944.

21

Washington Star, April 2, 1944.

22

New York Times, April 2, 1944.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1995

9

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 31 [1995], No. 1, Art. 4

9

Swiss in other parts of the country were not so courteous. Inflamed by exaggerated
accounts of the damage at Schaffhausen-- Der Bund (Bern) reported that the city had been
reduced to "an ocean of flames and a field of rubble" 23--some Swiss lashed out at Americans.
The Washington Post, April 3, 1944, reported that "in Bern anger flared after the first reports
pictured Schaftbausen as almost completely destroyed. Youngsters shouted 'di:r:ty Americans'
at several members of the United States legation. One American was not permitted to rent an
apartment he had tentatively accepted yesterday." The New York Herald Tribune, April 5,
1944, informed its readers that fistfights had broken out between Swiss and Americans and "to
guard against incidents, Americans . . . received instructions to avoid bars and public places,
to eat at restaurants only if necessary and to leave immediately after they were finished and to
continue normally but apologetically their relations with Swiss friends, while avoiding possible
bitter conversations with strangers." One Swiss newspaper, claiming to speak for the whole
country, accused the American airmen who attacked Schafthausen of being "war criminals."
The unhappiness of many Swiss extended beyond the devastation at Schaffhausen to the
allied policies which, they believed, had sown the seeds of the disaster: the violation of Swiss
neutrality by the unrelenting allied penetration of Swiss airspace. In the spring of 1944 the
Swiss congratulated themselves on keeping their land boundaries inviolate, but were deeply
frustrated by their inability to prevent the "incessant" overflights of their country by the
belligerent powers, especially by the British and Americans. 24

Swiss diplomats deluged

Washington and London with protests about the conduct of their air forces. They regularly
received assurances that remedial measures would be taken, but the intrusions continued.
Although the Swiss Air Force had not been totally passive in confronting the trespassers and
although certain newspapers thought that a more vigorous air defense was possible, there
appeared to be a general recognition in Switzerland that the air force could not halt the violation
of the country's airspace by the powerful and increasingly sophisticated allied air armaqas. The
inefficacy of both diplomacy and force suggested to some Swiss that in an era of modem warfare

23

Der Bund, April 3, 1944.

24

Journal de Geneve, April 4, 1944.
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neutrality might no long~r be capable of achieving one of its objectives--the protection of the
population--and raised the question of whether modem military technology had vitiated the
effectiveness of the cherished neutrality policy which had helped to give the nation its identity.
As the American minister to Switz.erland, Leland Harrison, perceived, Schaffhausen aroused
complex reactir:1ns in Switz.erland, "resentment and indignation on material, moral and theoretical
grounds. "25

Der Bund, April 3, 1944, also commented on the complexity of the Swiss

reaction, noting that not only had the "personal feelings" of the Swiss been hurt, but that their
"civil-democratic pride" had been wounded.
Although some Swiss professed to believe that the United States attacked Schaffbausen
to staunch the flow of Swiss supplies to the German war machine, the factories hit in
Schaffhausen, which produced consumer goods such as silverware, pottery, and leather, refuted ·
this notion. Swiss newspapers were prompt to dismiss the suspicion that the raid was a "brutal
reprisal" for the nation's assistance to the Third Reich. The attack was, most Swiss assumed,
a "tragic mistake." The American bombers, most Swiss agreed, intended to attack Singen, a
German city eleven miles northeast of Schaffhausen which was a rail transshipment point for
goods bound for the Nazi armies in Italy and contained some significant heavy industry. 26
That Schaffhausen was attacked instead of Singen the Swiss blamed on the American
pilots' ignorance of geography. The Swiss believed that the Yankee fliers must not have known
that the Swiss boundary ran north of the Rhine at Schaffbausen and must have assumed that
anything north of the river was German and hence fair game. "The geographical and political
ideas" of the American air force were "clearly inadequate," complained the Journal de

Geneve.v In a characteristic aside, Der Bund patronizingly remarked that "perhaps one ...
should not expect an exact knowledge of the details of European geography from Americans. "28

25

Harrison to Cordell Hull, April 2, 1944, Record Group 59, 411.54, National Archives.

26

Journal de Geneve, April 3, 4, 1944; Gazette de La,usanne, April 3, 1944; National
Zeitung, April 3, 1944.
n April 4, 1944.
28

April 5, 1944.
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The assertions of American ignorance were, in some cases, a product of a strain of antiAmericanism that thrived in certain Swiss political and intellectual circles in the 1930s, a view
tinctured by an ideology that considered the United States as the citadel of vulgar, ill-informed
monopoly capitalism. 29 Counteracting this "ugly American" image in Switzerland was a deeply
rooted admiration (more abstract, perhaps,_ than personal) of the United States which was
captured by the "sister republics" metaphor. Beginning in the 1770s and intensifying in the
nineteenth century the idea established itself that there was a special relationship between the
United States and Switzerland because they were fellow republican nations in a hostile
monarchical world. The bond between the two countries was thought to have been strengthened
by the reciprocal borrowing of political institutions, the American Constitution of 1787 being
a model for the first Swiss Federal Constitution of 1848 and the Swiss initiative and referendum
being widely adopted by American state governments before World War 1. 30
The "great sister republic" metaphor was invoked by the Swiss Federal Council in 1939
as it sought to justify the country's participation in the New York World's Fair, 31 and its grip
on the Swiss consciousness was one of the factors that predisposed many Swiss to the allied
cause when World War II began and moved them to regard as "heroes" the American pilots who
guided their crippled planes to the safety of Swiss airfields. 32

An anecdote, probably

apocryphal, which appeared in Time magazine, March 6, 1944, showed the presumption of
mutual friendship that the sister republics theme encouraged. Purporting to be reporting a
conversation between a Swiss anti-aircraft battery and "a trespassing formation of U.S.
bombers," Time printed the following dialogue:

29

On this point, see Heinz K. Meier, Friendship under Stress. U.S.-Swiss Relations 19001950 (Bern, 1970), 146-7.
3

°For the development -of the Sister Republics metaphor, see Jam~s H. Hutson, The Sister
Republics (2nd ed., Washington, 1992); French and German lanuage editions were published by
Stampfli Verlag, Bern, 1992).
31

Meier, op. cit., note 29, 263.

32

New York Times, April 5, 1944.
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Swiss ground· commander: "You are over Switzerland."
U.S. Air Commander: "We know.."
Swiss: "If you don't tum back we will shoot.
U.S.: "We know.

ti

ti

The conversation paused during a furious ack-ack [anti-aircraft artillery] barrage, th~n resumed.
U.S.: "Your fire is 1,000 feet low."
Swiss: "We know."
The attack on Schaffhausen made the front pages of the major American newspapers,
which carried feature stories about the iJ:lcident and pictures of the wounded city. The disaster
destroyed American innocence, for the people of the United States had not yet been confronted
with a lethal attack by their forces on a neutral nation. Earlier in the war Russia had bombed
Sweden, Germany, Ireland, Britain and Switzerland; Geneva, Renens, Basel and Zurich were
hit in 1940 with some loss of life. Americans, however, had been persuaded that their air force
would not spill neutral blood because of what were represented to be its superior military skills
and moral sensitivities. Unlike the British, whose nighttime area bombing many considered a
form of indiscriminate violence, American commanders insisted on precision daylight bombing
of military targets only, a strategy designed to minimiz.e civilian casualties. The American Air
Force had no intention, one of its top commanders asserted, "of throwing the strategic bomber
at the man in the street. "33
But when the man in the Schaffhausen street was killed, many ordinary citizens were
outraged. They found their voice in one Raymond B. Young, Jr., who wrote the Washington

Post on April 7, 1944, that "however great the anger or sorrow caused in the heart of the Swiss
people, directly affected, it will never surpass the anger found here at the news: the 'maddest'
people of all will be Americans." Describing the massive outpouring of sympathy for the Swiss,
the Neue Zurcher Zeitung reported that Americans condemned the "unforgivable sin" of their
airmen and offered their condolences and apologies to ordinary Swiss citizens in the United
States through "visits, letters, telegrams and telephone calls." Americans, the Zurich newspaper
33

Michael Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New
Haven, 1987), 144.
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reported, held the Swiss in the highest esteem as "true democrats and compassionate helpers"
and claimed that "Switzerland was the last land that they wished to see harmed by the United
States. "34
American newspapers, reflecting Swiss assumptions, informed their readers that the target
of the raid on Schaffhausen was Singen. 35 The proximity of Schaffhausen to Singen did not,
however, excuse what the Washington Post in an editorial of April 3 denounced as an
"unpardonable" attack. In an editorial of April 5 the Washington Star demanded an investigation
of the Schaffhausen raid, since "it is difficult to understand how, in daylight, our bombers could
have mistakenly attacked a peaceful city across the Rhine and eleven miles from the intended
German target.• The most influential voice in American journalism, that of Walter Lippmann,
was aroused by the Schaffhausen incident.

In a column of April 4, 1944,36 Lippmann

expressed the nation's regret over the attack and criticiz.ed officials of the Board of Economic
Warfare for attempting to compel the Swiss to modify their commercial policies by what
Lippmann regarded as ill-conceived economic sanctions. Lippmann's tribute to Switzerland
deserves to be quoted at some length:
Neutrality does not arouse much sympathy in nations who are desperately at war.
But the neutrality of Switzerland is a very special thing, indeed unique. Only
Switzerland in all of Europe has made no concessions. Surrounded by the Fascist
world, its neutrality has been much more than a policy of staying out of war.
The Swiss have maintained intact their democratic liberties because they hold
them dear and because their hearts are stout. That is a great contribution to
mankind. Through the darkest days of the war, when Hitler seemed about to
sweep all Europe before him, the moral resistance of the Swiss has reassured us
that once a nation has known liberty, it will never willingly surrender it.
Their example should never be forgotten and if ~ere is anything this

34

Neue zarcher Zeitung, April 8, 1944.

35

New York Times, April 2, 1944.

36

New York Herald Tribune, April 4, 1944.
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-government can do to express not only its regret for the Schaffhausen bombing
but its appreciation of the part Switzerland has played, it should do it. It should
take the risks of giving the Swiss the benefit of the doubt as between the
judgment of some official here and their honest representations. We shall be
amply repaid if we come out of this war with the confidence and friendship of the
Swiss nation.
Let us not forget the indispensable part which Switzerland has to play in
the healing of the nations. By long historical tradition Switzerland is the seat, so
to speak the capital, of mankind's works of charity and of mercy. We shall need
Switzerland when the war is over. It will stand there, firm and free, in a sea of
misery and hatred. We shall need the Swiss because they alone perhaps will be
able to go everywhere, feared by none and trusted by all.
Realizing all that, we shall be wise if, jolted by this terrible mishap, we
go beyond the obvious regrets and indemnities to larger actions which express our
moral solidarity with this admirable people.
Swiss newspapers supplied their readers with generous summaries of the "condolences
of the American press. "37 Sympathetic editorials in the New York Times and the Washington

Post were rqx;,rted in full, as was Lippmann's salute to Switzerland, which appeared on the front
page of the Neue Zaricher Zeitung. 38

Commenting on the role of the press in the crisis,

Minister Harrison observed: "The attitude of the American press was very helpful in convincing
the Swiss of the factual state of American opinion in the matter and contributed materially to
assuaging anger and resentment and restoration of calmness here. I am pleased to report that
the Swiss press evinced no hesitation in presenting fully the American reaction. "39
The American political and military establishment shared the ordinary citizen's anguish
and guilt over Schaffhausen and was profuse in its apologies to the Swiss. Secretary of State

31

Basler Nachrichten, April 3, 1944.

38

April 5, 1944.

39

Harrison to Cordell Hull, April 20, 1944, Record Group 59, 411.54, National Archives.
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Cordell Hull issued a statement on April 340 in which he expressed "my own and all
Americans' deep regret over the tragic bombing," adding that Secretary of War Henry Stimson
"has expressed to me the deep regret he and the American Air Force feel over this tragedy."
'"Every precaution," Hull advised the Swiss, "will be taken to prevent in so far as is humanly
possible the repetition of this unfortunate event." Assistant Secretary of State Breckinr.dge Long
and Director of the Office of European Affairs James Dunn delivered Hull's message to the
Swiss ambassador, Charles Bruggmann, on the afternoon of April 3 and the next day Stimson
wrote Bruggmann a personal letter, expressing his "deep feeling of horror" at the attack on
Schaffhausen. 41

In Europe Minister Harrison called on the Swiss foreign minister, Marcel

Pilet-Golaz, on the afternoon of April 1 to express his regrets and sympathy. American consuls
in various Swiss cities called on local authorities to express their condolences. On the afternoon
of April 3, General Carl Spaatz, commander of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe,
and the American ambassador to the Court of St. James, John G. Winant, called on the Swiss
charge d'affaires in London to convey regrets and explain "how sincerely sorry our airmen were
that this had happened. 1142 The next day Spaatz's superior, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold,
wrote his counterpart, General Rihner, commander of the Swiss air force, to "express personally
. . . my extreme regret over the sad occurrence at Schaffhausen on April 1. I know that you
understand that the bombing of this peaceful and friendly town could only have taken place as
the result of error. 1143
The chief of staff of the American army, General George C. Marshall, personally
interested himself in Schaffhausen and urged Secretary of State Hull to pay compensation without

~ecord Group 165, National Archives_.
41

lbid.

42

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, IV, 793.

43

Memorandum, April 5, 1944, Spaatz Papers, Box 17, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress.
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quibbling: "Seek Switrerland's bill," Marshall advised Hull, "and pay it promptly. "44 Minister
Harrison was, accordingly, instructed on April 5 to procure from the Swiss a full account of the
damage done at Schaffhausen so that "appropriate reparations" could be paid. In the meantime
Harrison was authorized to disburse $1,000,000 to the Swiss as a downpayment on the
Schaffhausen account. In October 1944 the United States paid another $3,000,000, although
everyone recognized that the final bill would be far higher.
The bombing of Schaffhausen could not have come at a worse ijme for the American Air
Force. The Air Force was a "brand new" arm of the American military which "had come to
maturity almost overnight, just as the great war got started. "45 It was resented by traditionalists
who accused it of overselling its capacities. Skeptics about air power were not averse to seeing
the pretensions of their brash young brethren deflated and were prepared to seize upon any
failure to make a case for reducing the Air Force's role in the war. The fiasco at the famous
battle of Cassino, Italy, in mid-March 1944 played into the hands of the Air Force's critics.
Bombers saturated Cassino with high explosives, inducing the commander of the operation to
proclaim "exuberantly ... that the town had been wiped out. "46 Far from being obliterated,
German defenders emerged from their bunkers at Cassino and decisively repelled an allied
ground offensive. To make matters worse, the Air Force was compelled to admit that because
of "mistakes in target identification, "47 it had bombed and killed allied troops invading Cassino.
The debacle at Cassino and the Air Force's failure to sweep the skies of the Luftwaffe,
as it had set out to do in the first months of 1944, produced in the United States what a
commentator in the Washington Star on April 9; 1944, called a "tendency in some quarters to
begin doubting its [the Air Force's] amazing potency." Enthusiasts, the commentator explained,
had trumpeted the Air Force's potential "in terms of hyperbole, as if it could win the war by

44

General Thomas T. Handy, memorandum, April 5, 1944, Record Group 165, National
Archives.
45

Washington Star, April 9, 1944.

46

General Ira Eaker was the boaster. Washington Star, April 1, 1944.

41

New York Times, April 7, 1944.
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itself. . . . Accordingly, now that it has been found to .be less than omnipotent, there is danger
that its shortcomings will be equally exaggerated in a sort of reverse hyperbole." Faced with
an incipient disillusion with its capabilities, the Air Force feared that critics would cite
Schaffbausen as fresh evidence of systematic incompetence.
The Air Force's strategy in dealing with Schaffbausen was to hunker down (an
appropriate Vietnam War term), say as little as possible about the incident, and hope that it
would quickly recede from the public's consciousness. Reporters were permitted to interview
participants in the raid, but "censors stopped all direct quotations from the fliers and their
commanding officers pertaining to the actual bombing, evidently on instructions from higher
up. H48
A small crack was opened on the raid by fliers who said they were driven off course by
unexpectedly high winds. The official Air Force communique, issued early in the morning of
April 2, was extremely brief. As carried over American wire services, it stated that "Liberators
penetrated deep into southwest Germany to blast industrial and communications targets," but that
"due to difficulties of navigation in bad weather some bombs fell on Swiss territory by
mistake. "49
Reuters, the British news agency, paraphrased the statement about the weather, subtly
but significantly altering it, to read "in consequence of poor visibility" bombs erroneously fell
on Switzerland.

Carried in several Swiss newspapers, 50 the Reuters dispatch irritated the

Swiss, because, as the Basel Nachrichten declared on April 3, "all reports agreed that the .
bombardment of Schaffbausen occurred under clear skies." The American military attache in
Switzerland, General Barnwell R. Legge, urged the Air Force to disavow the claim (which it
never made) that "poor visibility" was responsible for the disaster at Schaffbausen,51 but the

48

lbid., April 3, 1944.

49

Washington Post, April 2, 1944.

50

National Zeitung, April 4, 1944; Basler Nachrichten, April 3, 1944.

51

To War Department, April 4, 1944, Record Group 165, National Archives.
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Air Force declined, having no interest in keeping the story alive. By revealing that high winds
and unspecified weather and navigational problems were instrumental in the bombing of
Schaffbausen, and by not contradicting public speculation that Singen was the actual target of
the B-24s, the Air Force evidently assumed that it had a plausible explanation for the disaster
of April 1. It did not seem so farfetched that planes could be blown ten miles off course . .·That
the wind-buffeted bombers had hit a neutral city was painful, of course, but far less damaging
to the Air Force's credibility than a nightmarish story of a raid gone haywire because of the
failure of newly introduced high technology, resulting in squadrons of American bombers getting .
lost, frantically crisscrossing southern Germany in a futile search for targets, only to bomb the
wrong targets in three different countries and to identify wrongly the targets wrongly bombed.
A misadventure of precisely this magnitude befell the 8th Air Force on April 1 and resulted in
the disaster at Schaffbausen.
The target of the American B-24s on April 1 was not Singen. Their primary target was
some two hundred kilometers north of the . Singen-Schaffhausen area, specifically, the I. G.
Farben plant at Ludwigshafen, Germany, described by the Air Force as the "largest and most
important manufacturer of wartime chemical products in Europe" and luridly stigmatized by the
American press as "the poison gas manufacturing center" of Germany. The secondary target
for the American fliers was the "center of the city" of Ludwigshafen. The "last resort target"
was "any military objective positively identified as being in Germany. "52
Ludwigshafen was a favorite target of the 8th Air Force.

The Farben works were

bombed on December 30, 1943, and again on January 7, 1944, but little damage was
inflicted. 53 In September 1944 the giant chemical complex was attacked ten times. A raid
against Ludwigshafen was scheduled for March 31 but was canceled because of "turbulent
weather" that grounded all missions over western Europe, that of April 1 excepted, until April _
7. Bad weather was as formidable an enemy of the 8th Air Force as the Luftwaffe itself. The

5

2Tactical Report of Mission of April 1, 1944, written on April 25, 1944; reel 526.331,
Bolling Air Force Base.
53

Report of Operations, January 7, 1944, reel 520.331, ibid.
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Air Force Weather Service calculated that in an average year the weather over Germany was
clear enough for visual bombing only 20 percent of the time; only thirteen days, the weathermen
estimated, were suitable for visual bombing between January and March. 54 If only a handful
. of raids were possible, an air offensive against Germany would be futile, for her factories could
be repaired or dispersed during the intervals betw~n attacks. What the American command
needed was a technology that would permit it to prosecute the air war unceasingly, in good
weather and bad. What it found was radar.
Recognizing the potential of radar for warfare, the British in 1941 began developing H2S,
a self-contained system using a beam of transmitted energy to produce a map-like picture on the
indicator of a cathode ray tube.

The British mounted H2S on "pathfinders," specifically

modified aircraft that led squadrons to targets obscured by clouds. Following the British lead,
the United States Air Force developed its own radar bombing technology, which it called H2X.
Installed in American pathfinders, the H2X systems was first deployed in combat on November
3, 1943. 55
At the time of the attack on Schaftbausen, radar bombing was still an experimental
technology, subject to the usual glitches and malfunctions. Assessing H2X on March 22, 1944,
General Spaatz conceded that it was "interim equipment about which much remains to be
learned." Since "we cannot run before we learn to walk," Spaatz was prepared to bear with
H2X during its period of "growing pains. "56 The major virtue of the new technology was that
by taking the weather out of play, it allowed the 8th Air Force to attack Germany unremitting! y.
Spaatz claimed that because of H2X "fighters and bombers operate in weather which was never
conceived to be suitable for combat operations and, as a result, we have been able to maintain
approximately five times the pressure on the enemy than would have been possible if we were

54

Hugh Odishaw, "Radar Bombing in the Eighth Air Force," pp. 11-12, Spaatz papers, Box
80, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Odishaw's essay is a thorough post-war
assessment of the effectiveness of the use of radar by the 8th Air Force. The author was a staff
member of the Radiation Laboratory at MIT.
55

/bid., 39.

56

Ibid., 61-2.
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restricted to visual bombing. "57 Without H2X American planes would not have attempted to
fly in the foul weather of April 1. That Ludwigshafen was target on that day was no accident,
because one of t~e strengths of H2X was its ability to discriminate between land and water, and
extending, as it did, three miles along the east bank of the Rhine, the Farben works, it was
assumed, could be located and attacked in the worst of conditions.
The Air Force planned to commit 467 bombers and 489. fighter escorts (mostly P-47s,
but some P-5ls) against Ludwigshafen. 58 The Third Division of the 8th Air Force supplied 259
B-17s; the Second Division 208 B-24s. Leaving their bases in England early on the morning ·
of April 1, the B-17s encountered such bad weather just inside France that they aborted their
mission and returned home. 59 Plans called for the three combat wings of the Second Division
to assemble near Orfordness, England, and begin crossing the Channel at 8:40 a.m. The 20th
Combat Wing, consisting of the 448th, 446th and the 93rd bombardment groups, led the
division; following at a three-minute interval was the 14th Combat Wing which on this day
consisted of two rather than the customary three bombardment groups: the 392nd group, based
at Wendling, England, and the 44th, based at Norwich. These were the units that bombed
Schaffhausen. At the rear of the division was the 2nd Combat Wing, consisting of the 453rd,
389th and 44th bombardment groups. Two H2X pathfinder planes flew at the head of each .
combat wing. Assigned to lead the planes to Ludwigshafen, they were the eyes of the division.
The 20th Combat Wing, with the two other wings following, left the English coast at
8:47 a.m. Trouble began shortly after the French coast was reached, for there the wing's 446th
Bombardment Group "became scattered due to a dense cloud layer and haze and abandoned the
mission. "6() The other B-24s proceeded eastward into the same weather that had repelled the
57

Spaatz to Arnold, March 14, 1945, Spaatz Papers, Box 21, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress.
58

Figures about the number of planes that were airworthy on April 1 vary slightly in different
Air Fofce accounts.
5

9Narrative of Operations, 8th Air Force, April 1, 1944, reel 520.332, Bolling Air Force

Base.
ro-ractical Report of April 1, 1944, mission, April 25, 1944, reel 526.331, ibid.
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Third Division's B-17s.

Solid clouds prevailed above 19,000 feet and an impenetrable

"undercast" obscured the ground; throughout the whole route, one navigator reported, "the haze
was extremely thick making it difficult to identify anything on the ground. "61 Threading their
way through the layers of clouds and haze, the B-24 crews must have had the sensation of flying
in a tunnel. Under these conditions their radars must perform flawlessly! No sooner, howevr;r,
had the division made landfall in France than the H2X equipment in both pathfinder planes
leading the 20th Combat Wing and hence the entire division malfunctioned. As a result, the
pathfinders and the entire division following them veered off course. As an officer of the 392nd
Bombardment Group later complained, "the PFF (pathfinder) ship led us completely astray,
being continually south of course. "62
The proper course, the briefed course in Air Force terminology, required the Second
Division to cross the French coast northeast of Dunkerque and then to fly so·utheast; when it
reached the Mosel River north of Trier, the division was instructed to tum due east until it was
over Bad Kreuznach, near the bend of the Rhine River at Bingen; there the division was ordered
to take a 45° tum to the southeast to make its bombing run on Ludwigshafen. Because of the
errant pathfinders, when the Second Division had flown far enough east to begin its bombing
run, it was one hundred miles south of where it should have been. 63 There was, consequently,
a "great deal of uncertainty as to position.• In fact, the division was lost, as crewmen admitted
to each other over their radios. 64

The B-24s now engaged in a period of hectic zigzagging

across the skies, "essing back and forth sharply trying to get into position. "65 By this time the

61

Report of Lead Navigator (Christian Koch), 392nd Bombardment Group, April 3, 1944,
reel 526.332, ibid.
62

392nd Bombardment Group, report, reel BO 445, GP 391-92, ibid.

63

8th Air Force, Report of Operations, April 1, 1944, written June 24, 1944, reel 520.331,

ibid.
64

Report of Lead Navigator (C. E. Shuler), 44th Bombardment Group, April 2, 1944, reel
526.332, ibid.
65

/bid.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol31/iss1/4

22

et al.: Full Issue

22
H2X equipment in the 14th and 2nd combat wings had also failed. 66 Every piece of radar in
the division was now out of order!

Amidst the confusion, seventeen of the twenty-six B-24s

of the 20th Combat Wing's 93rd Bombardment Group misinterpreted the actions of another
squadron and accidentally bombed Strasbourg, France, although the inhabitants of the city were
fortunate enough to have me st of the bombs fall five miles west of town. 67
The 2nd Combat Wing now took the division lead and executed a sharp tum to the
southeast, since the target run on the briefed course required such a maneuver. The problem
was that since this tum was begun one hundred miles south of the briefed course, it carried the
B-24s even further away from Ludwigshafen in the direction of the Swiss border. In due course
it was recognized that "a considerable navigational error had been made" and a 1800 tum to the
north was executed. 68 For the next thirty minutes a mixed formation of 2nd and 20th combat
wing planes flew north. The H2X equipment in the pathfinders was working again and they
located a target that they identified as Ludwigshafen. The B-24s bombed the city, although some
of the units believed that they had attacked Reutlingen, a city southeast of Stuttgart, while others
thought they might have bombed Stuttgart itself. The target actually hit, with "poor results" as
photo reconnaissance later showed, was Pforzheim, a town forty-five miles southeast of
Ludwigshafen. 69
Pforzheim was bombed at 11 :04 A.M. Since the attack on Ludwigshafen was scheduled
to begin at 9:57 a.m., the planes of the 2nd and 20th combat wings spent more than an hour
searching for a target which most of the time was more than one hundred miles to their north.

66

Report of Operations Officer (Heber Thompson), 448th Bombardment Group, April 2,
1944, reel 526.332, ibid.
67

Report, June 24, 1944, note 63, above.

68

lbid.

69

Report of Lead Navigator (Arthur Kline), 448th Bombardment Group, April 2, 1944, reel
526.332, Bolling Air Force Base; Report of Formation Commander (Carl Fleming), 445th
Bombardment Group, April 2, 1944, ibid.; Tactical Report of April 1, 1944 mission, April 25,
1944, reel 526.331; Spaatz to Arnold, April 1, 1944, Arnold Papers, Box 190, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
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Unable to find the B-24s over the briefed target area, the P-47 and P-51 fighters never made a
planned rendezvous with them70 and were unable to protect them from German interceptors.
Not that it mattered, because the weather was too bad for the Luftwaffe to take off and challenge
the American bombers.
The 14th Combat Wing reacted to the disorientation differently than did the 2nd and 20th
wings. Instead of following these wings on their tum to the southeast and then on their abrupt
reversal to the north, the 14th Combat Wing took an east by southeast course that carried it even
further from Ludwigshafen than its comrades.

As the wing proceeded eastward, its H2X

equipment came back to life with tragic results. First, the pathfinder aircraft, leading the 392nd
Group and the 44th Group, directed "several runs on unidentified targets that were for the most
part fields. "71 Then, the pathfinders identified a target, which faded from their screens, as Bad
Kreuznach, 72 the point on the briefed route northwest of Ludwigshafen at which the bombing
run on the city was to begin.

Having flown eastward beyond what it supposed was Bad

Kreuznach, the wing reversed course and turned back toward the west. Soon thereafter, at
10: 19 A.M, the 392nd's pathfinder picked up a target. Claiming that he had "the target in
scope," the pathfinder operator led a bombing run on what the 392nd believed to be
Ludwigshafen. 73 The H2X equipment failed just as the attack began and a visual bombing run
was ordered. A visual run was possible because for the first time during the entire mission "a

7

°Report of Operations, June 24, 1944, note 63, above.

71

Report of Lead Bombardier (John King), 44th Bombardment Group, reel 526.332, Bolling

AFB.
72

Report of Operations, June 24, 1944; Tactical Report, April 25, 1944; see notes 60 and
63 above.
73

Report of Lead Bombardier (Joseph Whittaker), 392nd Bombardment Group, April 1,
1944, reel 526.332, Bolling AFB; General Thomas Handy to General Barnwell Legge, April 6,
1944, Record Group 165, National Archives. Other participants in the raid recognized that they
were attacking a "target of opportunity," not Ludwigshafen.
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few large breaks in the undercast" opened up above the target, 74 affording visibility that one
of the 392nd's navigators described as "five to seven tenths" obstructed.75 The visual run was
orchestrated by the bombardier aboard the lead pathfinder and, ·like every other aspect of this
hapless mission, it miscarried. As described by an officer in the 392nd, "the PFF bombardier
took over and he got a pre-release falling short of the target he was aiming at. "76 Since the
twenty-two other B-24s of the 392nd dropped their bombs on signal flares released by pathfinder
plane, their payloads also fell short of the target and landed in a "three miles south and east of
the city of Schaffouson, Switrerland in woods area. "71
The Swiss confirmed that one squadron of B-24s had bombed a wooded area outside of
Schaffhausen. In his report to the City Council on April 12, Mayor Bringolf mentioned that one
wave of American bombers had bombed along the left bank of the Rhine, hitting Kohlfirst,
identified on contemporary maps as a "park and forest."

One spectator reported seeing

"numerous columns of smoke arising" from Kohlfirst; another asserted that a forest fire had
broken out there. 78 Kohlfirst was obviously the wooded area southeast of Schaftbausen that the
392nd Bombardment Group reported hitting as a result of the accidental prerelease of its bombs.
The actions of the 44th Bombardment Group are more difficult to reconcile with
descriptions of Swiss ground observers. The 44th, which had flown behind the 392nd during
the entire mission, somehow realized, as it reversed its course and headed west, that it was over
Lake Constance, south of the German city of Friedrichshafen, which the 14th Combat Wing had
bombed on March 16. Since the 44th had been assigned to fly at a higher altitude than the
392nd, some of its crew members were able to catch a glimpse of the Alps, "just visible" to

74

Report of Command Pilot (James McFadden), 392nd Bombardment Group, April 3, 1944,
reel 526.332, Bolling AFB.
75

Report of Lead Navigator, 392nd Bombardment Group, note 61, above.
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Report of Lead Bombardier, 392nd Bombardment Group, note 73, above.
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Neue zarcher Zeitung, April 3, 1944; Harrison to Cordell Hull, April 20, 1944, Record
Group 59, 411.54, National Archives.
·
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their south. 79

The navigator and bombardier of the 44th's second section concluded,

accordingly, as they flew west that they must be over Switzerland.
Three of the second section's planes had become detached during the chaotic conditions
afflicting the mission and had joined the 44th's first section with the result that, as the 44th
approached Schaffhausen, fifte~n B-24s flew in its first section, nine in its second section. What
happened next is not entirely clear, but the mission reports of the 44th's Lead Navigator, 1st Lt.
C. E. Shuler, and its Lead Bombardier, 1st Lt. John F. King (see appendix), seem to indicate
that the fifteen B-24s of the Group's first section, seeing red signal flares released by the 392nd,
assumed that it had bombed Schafthausen and followed suit, taking as its aiming point "the
buildings south of the town by the large bend in the river. "80
According to Lt. King, the navigator and bombardier leading the nine B-24s of the
second section "both knew their position, so did not release their bombs when the first section's
bombs started to fall. NSi The second section proceeded on a northwesterly course and once it
was certain that it was over Germany bombed, as a "target of opportunity," the small town of
Grafenhausen, although what military objective in the town justified such an attack is not clear.
Fortunately for Grafenhausen, the release mechanism in the section leader's plane malfunctioned

~eport of Lead Bombardier, 44th Bombardment Group, note 64, above.
8

°Report of the Lead Bombardier, 44th Bombardment Group, note 71, above.

81

Ibid. Charles McBride, who flew in the 448th Bombardment Group on April 1, published
a book in 1989 that presents an account of the attack on Schaffhausen that is consistent with Lt.
King's description. According to McBride, Lt. A. N. Williams, identified as the lead navigator
of the second section of the 44th Bombardment Group, knew he was over Switrerland and
ordered the section to withhold its bombs. McBride's account is based on some documentary
research and on reminiscences of surviving crewmen forty-five years after the event. How much
credence is to be given to his description of Lt. Williams' actions is not certain since elsewhere
in his book there are substantial errors, i.e., "on 22 February 1945 Schaffhausen was struck
again" with considerable loss of life. It is odd that there is no report filed by Lt. Williams in
the official Air Force records nor is his name mentioned in the official investigations of the
bombing of Schafthausen .. See Charles McBride, Mission Failure and Survival (Manhattan,
Kansas, 1989), 79, 126.
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and, as a result, the section's bombs "were seen to fall over the aiming point. " 82
A major mystery of the bombing of Schaffbausen is why the second section of the 44th
Bombardment Group did not radio its comrades in the first section that the group was over
Switzerland and should not bomb. Why, in fact, was the 392nd not alerted as well? The
records offer no explanation for a silence so portentous for Schaffhausen.

·

If the preceding reconstruction of the actions of the 14th Combat Wing over Schaffhausen
is correct, the following happened: the 392nd Bombardment Group, leading the wing, bombed
the forest at Kohlfirst; the 15 B-24s of the first section of the 44th Bombardment Group then
bombed Schaffhausen; the third and final unit, the nine B-24s of the second section of the 44th
Bombardment Group, recognizing that Schafthausen was in Switzerland, flew over the city and
bombed Grafenhausen, Germany. This recreation of the raid is at odds, however, with the
unanimous testimony of Swiss ground observers, who asserted that the third, not the second,
section of B-24s bombed Schaffhausen.
American records and Swiss observers agree that three waves of B-24s were involved in
the attack on Schaffhausen and vicinity. On April 2 General Legge, the American military
attache, sent Washington a summary of the official Swiss version of the bombing: "3 waves of
US AAF planes coming from direction Frauenfeld crossed Schaffhausen altitude 5000-7000
meters at 10:50. Leading wave circled, dropped smoke signal ... Second wave did not bomb.
Third wave same as first. "83
At a news conference on April 1, Schaffhausen Mayor Bringholf asserted that it was "the
unanimous opinion" of observers that "three waves of 30, 20 and 24 bombers" had approached
the city and that only the third wave had done the actual bombing. 84 A correspondent of the

Neue Zurcher Zeitung, who had climbed the tower of the Catholic Church in Neuhausen to
obtain an unobstructed view of the raid, confirmed Bringolf s statement", asserting that after the
first group ofB-24s "emerged from a cloud" and bombed south of the Rhine "about two minutes
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1bid.
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1.egge to War Department, April 2, 1944, Record Group 165, National Archives.
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Basler Nachrichten, April 3, 1944.
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later a second squadron fle~ _o ver without dropping any bombs," followed by a third squadron
that attacked the city. 85
Swiss and American accounts can be reconciled only by assuming that Lieutenants Shuler
and King, the 44th's lead navigator and bombardier, had found themselves during the day's
confusion leading the entire Group from a position in front of the second section. If Shuler ancf
King were, in fact, the navigator and bombardier described in King's mission report who "both
knew their position," they would have led the smaller second section over Schaftbausen without
dropping bombs, while the larger first section, following, would have committed the fatal error.
Thus, the third wave of American B-24s would have conducted the bombing, as Swiss observers
said that they did. If Shuler and King were, in fact, leading the entire Group at the head of the
second section (but how, then, could King have seen the bombs of the first section, which would
have been flying behind him?), their failure to inform the Group that it was over a neutral city
is inexplicable and would seem to be nothing short of criminally negligent.

The evidence

available, however, is not clear enough to convict Shuler and King of anything; all that it tells
us is that fifteen B-24s of the 44th Bombardment Group dropped their payloads on Schaftbausen
on the morning of April 1, 1944.
To suggest that Schaffhausen had escaped lightly on April 1, that it had been lucky,
would have been regarded in Switzerland as an obscene frivolity, but consider what would have
happened had the 14th Combat Wing attacked the city at full strength. Had a third bombardment
group been flying with the wing on April 1, as was customary, an additional twenty-four B-24s
would have made the bombing run against Schaftbausen. Even as it was, the city did not absorb
the full weight of the American attack. The 392nd Bombardment Group dropped 868 hundredpound incendiary bombs and 264 hundred-pound explosive bombs in the forest at Kohlfirst. The
section of the 44th Bombardment Group that passed the city by, hit Grafenhausen with 358
hundred-pound incendiaries and 180 hundred-pound explosives. The fifteen planes that actually
bombed Schafthausen dropped less than half of their payload on the city; they released 598

85

Neue Zurcher Z-eitung, April 3, 1944.
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hundred-pound incendiaries and 180 hundred-pound explosives. 86 If Mayor Bringolf's figures
are correct, if Schaffhausen was struck by 331 bombs, as he reported on April 12,87 more than
half of the fifteen B-24s' bombs must have fallen in the Engewald, a forest in the hills west of
the city where a Major Notz of the Swiss Army told the Journal de Geneve that a large number
of incendiary bombs had fallf.;n. 88 Had the 14th Combat Wing accurately dropped all of its
ordnance directly on Schaffhausen, the city would have been hit, not by 331 bombs, but by
1,824 hundred-pound incendiaries and 552 hundred-pound high explosives. Lucky Schaffhausen
to have been spared such an inferno!
The 8th Air Force promptly and aggressively investigated the bombing of Schaffhausen,
causing an officer of the 392nd Bombardment Group to complain that "a great deal of explaining
had to be done. "89 Because the facts about Schaffhausen, if revealed, would have been a public
relations disaster, the Air Force controlled the results of the investigation as tightly as possible.
On April 6, 1944, General Legge at Bern was furnished with what amounted to a summary of
a summary of the investigation which did not even reveal the target of the mission. 90 Bad
weather and navigational problems were blamed for the raid and, although Swiss newspapers
jeered at this explanation when the Air Force offered it on April 2, it was substantially true.
Legge was authorized to share these crumbs of the investigation with Swiss military officials in
Bern with the understanding, which the Swiss faithfully observed, that they be given "no
publicity or explanation which would probably lead to press criticism and be unconvincing to
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Figures on the number of bombs dropped are derived from the mission reports of King and
Whittaker; see notes 71 and 73, above.
87

A recent writer has asserted that Schaffhausen was hit by 366 bombs an4 nine duds.
Andreas Schiendorfer, Schafjha.user Nachrichten, March 31, 1994.
88

Journal de Geneve, April 3, 1944.
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Report, 392 Bombardment Group, April 1944, reel BO 495; GP 391-2, Bolling Air Force

Base.
~ar Department to Legge, April 6, 1944, Record Group 165, National Archives.
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laymen. "91
The same "investigation" was submitted to the Swiss ambassador in Washington, Charles
Bruggmann, on April 25, 1944, again with the understanding that "the matter should be treated
as confidential and not given publicity either here or in Switzerland. "92 When Ambassador
Bruggman asked for more information a week later, officials at the State Department told him,
truthfully, that they themselves did not know the target of the raid against Schaffhausen which
was being treated by the Air Force "in the category of military secrets. "93 In the absence of
further information, most Swiss have assumed that the target of the American bombers on April
1 was Singen. 94

In some quarters, however, the view still persists that the attack on

Schaffhausen was not an accident, but a punitive expedition, mounted by the Americans "to
teach the Swiss a lesson for supporting Germany with weapons deliveries and for laundering
dirty money. "95 After fifty years it is at last possible to drive a stake through the heart of this
91
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ibid.
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Neue zarcher Zeitung, March 31/April 1, 1984.
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Franco Battel, "Zurn 50 Jahrestag der Bombardierung Schaffhausens am 1 April 1944,"

Scha,jJhauser Mappe (1994), 12. Noting that speculation still exists that the attack against
Schaffhausen was a reprisal for Swiss economic support of the German war effort, Paul
Stahlberger asserts in the Neue Zurcher Zeitung, March 26-7, 1994, that in his opinion there was
the "highest probability" that the attack was a tragic error and that the target of the American
pilots was "presumably Ludwigshafen." Two Swiss military writers, who appear to have had
access to some American sources, state in commemorative articles that the target of the
American fliers was Ludwigshafen. See Hans von Rotz, "Es war ein fataler Irrtum,"
Scha,ffhauser Nachrichten, March 31, 1994, and Kurz, "Vor 50 Jahren wurden Schaffhausen
bombardiert," Schweizer Soldat (April 1994), 16-7. In a letter to the editor, Neue Zurcher
Zeitung, April 15, Toni Schob cites Charles McBride's Mission Failure and Survival (Manhattan,
Kansas, 1989) as proof that the attack on April 1, 1944, was an error. An American bombardier
who participated in the attack, McBride verified in his memoir that the American target was
Ludwigshafen. The same conclusion was reached by the diplomatic historian Jonathan
Helmreich. See his "The Diplomacy of Apology. United States Bombings of Switzerland
During World War II," Air University Review, XXVIII (May-June, 1977), 20-37. All of these
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dark suspicion.
Swiss officials were satisfied by one piece of information that the American military was
willing to share with them in the aftermath of Schaffhausen. On April 20, 1944, General Legge
informed General Rihner, commander of the Swiss air force, that American planes were under
orders not to attack targets within fifty miles of the Swiss border unless they were positively _
identified. Legge reported to the War Department that Rihner was "extremely pleased" with this
information. 96 What the Swiss officer did not know, however, was that Legge was simply
affirming an American policy that had been in effect since 1943 and which governed the B-24s
that struck Schaffhausen.

The policy offered no additional security to Switzerland, whose

territory was, in fact, bombed by the American Air Force thirty-seven more times before the
war ended. 97
Some of these tliirty-seven incidents can scarcely be dignified by the term attack. As
Legge reported to the War Department on April 30, 1945, "many of them were apparently

accounts suffer from limited use of American archival sources; hence, they contain errors and
are incomplete. Massive documentation about the bombing of Schaffhausen exists in American
military and diplomatic archives, most of it not declassified until the mid-1970s; it irrefutably
proves that the 14th Combat Wing of the 8th Air Force was under orders to bomb Ludwigshafen
when it attacked Schaffhausen on April 1, 1944. Franco Battel is certainly wrong when he states
that "it is doubtful, whether sources really exist, that would be able to unequivocally clarify the
question" of whether the raid on Schaffhausen was an error or a reprisal. Battel is quoted from
"Die Bombardierung," Neue Zurcher 7.eitung, March 26-7, 1994.
96

Legge to War Department, April 20, 1944, Record Group 165, National Archives.

97

1n making claims for co~pensation, the Swiss government considered the attack on
Schaffhausen to have comprised three separate attacks: Schaffhausen, Flurlingen-Feuerthalen
and Schlatt. By Swiss reckoning, therefore, the United States had bombed--and the Americans
accepted the responsibility for--forty attacks on Switzerland from April 1, 1944, unti_l the end
of the war. In addition, the Swiss claimed that American planes had attacked Samaden in
Orisons on October 1, 1943, an attack which the United States acknowledged in the summer of
1944 and for which it paid compensation of $56,515 (Hull to Bruggmann, July 4, 1944, Record
Group 59,411.54, National Archives.) Thus, the United States accepted responsibility for fortyone attacks on Switzerland during World War II . . The Swiss government asserted that American
bombers conducted eight additional attacks against its territory, for which the United States
denied responsibility. Recapitulation of Bombing Claims, Headquarters, U.S. Forces European
Theater, Office Theater Chief of Claims, Feb. 12, 1947, ibid.
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considered of such slight significance at the time by Swiss military authorities that the Ml A
[military attache] was not even informed of their occurrence. "98 Typical of these episodes was
damage inflicted on a "steep slope" near the remote hamlet of Sulsana in Orisons on November
16, 1944, by a crippled American B-24 which jettisoned eight bombs before making an
emergency landing in Ticino. One of the bombs exploded on the hill, causing what was later
computed at $375 damage to a cultivated field and a surrounding forest. 99
Other strikes were not so innocuous, however, and as the ground war moved closer to
Switzerland after June 1944 American authorities cautioned the Swiss that American fliers,
despite their best intentions, might stray over the Swiss border and launch unauthorized attacks.
Responding on July 26, 1944, to a Swiss complaint about a bombing in Thurgau, the State
Department asserted that, as the allies closed in on Germany, "it is manifestly impossible to
hope that occasional violations will not occur. "100 No two Americans were more solicitous
of Swiss sensitivities than Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Army Chief of Staff George C.
Marshall, but both of these leaders accepted that there was no way to insulate the Swiss
completely from inadvertent American attacks.

Writing to Secretary of War Stimson on

September 15, 1944, Hull admitted that "incidents of this nature are bound to occur, and even
possibly to increase, as fighting devdops in close proximity to the Swiss border. "101 Three
days earlier, evaluating a Swiss proposal to assign observers to American ground forces,
Marshall observed that "repeated violations of Swiss frontiers and neutrality and the likelihood
of similar future incidents might indicate desirability of approving requests." Swiss observers
could "provide basis for mutual understanding, appreciation by Swiss of difficulty in determining
the border in all cases and understand confusion in targets, and would likewise remove in large

98

Legge to Military Intelligence Service, April 30, 1945, Record Group 165, ibid.

99

Swiss Aide-memoire, July 16, 1946, Record Group 59, 411.54, ibid.

•~emorandum, July 26, 1944, Record Group 165, ibid.
101
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measure basis of Swiss protests over continued violations. " 102
Although the Swiss were not prepared to concede officially that attacks on their territory
were inevitable and thus absolve the Allies of responsibility for them, they appreciated that the
eastward thrust of the American and British armies placed their border areas in jeopardy and
took steps to minimize the danger. On September 9, 1944, for example, Swiss diplomats called
at the War Department to express fears that Basel might be attacked because the land there was
"very similar to surrounding French terrain" and because there were three marshalling yards in
the area, one in France, another in Germany, and the third in Switzerland, all of which looked
alike from the air. 103 The Americans were also notified that Swiss trains were electrified,
while German and Italian locomotives used coal and hence could be distinguished by the steam
they emitted. Large Swiss crosses were painted on buildings, power plants, military installations
and in open fields along the Swiss-German and Swiss-Italian borders in hopes that they would
catch the eyes of American pilots and alert them to their positions. The crosses produced mixed
results. In February 1945 American pilots reported that, as they were strafing a train, "a Swiss
frontier boundary marker was seen one half mile to the south" and they broke off their attack.
On the other hand, planes of the 1st Tactical Air Force bombed Thayngen on Christmas Day,
1944, under the impression that they were attacking the "Singen railroad bridge in Germany;"
one Swiss citiz.en was killed, four wounded and "important damage" was inflicted on buildings
with large Swiss crosses painted on their roofs. 104
Although attacks on Switzerland in the fall of 1944 were infrequent and relatively
harmless, American overflights of Swiss territory continued to annoy Swiss officials and aroused
the State Department as well as the embassy at Bern to intercede with the War Department in
an effort to improve the situation. Hull reminded Stimson that American self-interests were
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Marshall to SHAEF -Main, Sept. 12, 1944, Record Group 331, SHAEF 373.5, ibid.
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War Department, memorandum, Sept. 10, 1944, Record Group, 59, 411.54, ibid.
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Neutral and occupied countries folder, Switzerland, Box 139, Spaatz Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress; Bruggmann to Hull, December 29, 1944; Divine to Culbertson,
January 26, 1945, Record Group 165, National Archives.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1995

33

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 31 [1995], No. 1, Art. 4

33

served by mollifying Switzerland because that country's neutrality permitted it "to perform
certain invaluable services on behalf of American prisoners of war. "105 General Legge made
a similar point, when he wrote General Dwight D. Eisenhower's headquarters on November 9,
1944, that the "repeated violations of the frontier are bringing about a feeling of bitterness on
the part of the Swiss" upon whose good will the "interest of some 1000 Air Force internees"
depended. 106
The American command was unmoved by these pleas as long as nothing horrific--no new
Schaffhausen--occurred to prick its conscience.

There were also, in its view, extenuating

circumstances for some of the episodes that provoked Swiss complaints. The Air Force, which
was admirably forthcoming about admitting culpability for attacks on Switzerland, was unable
to confirm that its planes had participated in a series of attacks in the Basel area in early
September 1944 and suggested that the offending aircraft might have been downed American
fighters, rehabilitated and flown by the Nazis, as part of "deliberate efforts by the Germans to
- injure .,Allied relations with Switzerland. "107 The Air Force agreed that it had attacked the
bridge across the_Rhine at Diessenhofen on November 9, 1944, as the Swiss charged, but
contended that American planes had hit only the German side of the bridge--a legitimate military
objective--and that the damage that had resulted in Swiss territory because of "flying debris" was
regrettable but unavoidable. 108 Nor did an incident at Chiasso on January 11, 1945, enlist
much Air Force sympathy. The Swi_ss complained that American fighters had attacked a railyard
at Chiasso and killed a locomotive engineer. An investigation revealed that the engineer had,
in fact, been killed by American planes that had been strafing an Italian train, heading north
from Como. As the .train neared the Chiasso railyard, it stopped in a tunnel. Spotting a steam
engine, north of the tunnel in the Chiasso railyard, an American pilot, having been instructed
that all Swiss trains were electrified, fired upon it under the assumption that it was the fugitive
105

Hull to Stimson, September 15, 1944, Record Group 49, 411.54, ibid.

106

Legge to W. B. Smith, November 9, 1944, Record Group 331, SHAEF 373.5, ibid.
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Italian locomotive. The train turned out to be Swiss, a fact that might have been established had
the Swiss cross on the roof of the Chiasso rail station not been covered with eighteen inches of
freshly fallen snow. 109
More flagrant examples of Air Force malfeasance would have to emerge before the
American high command would take further action. These occurred on February 22, 1945,
during Operation CLARION. CLARION was conceived as an offensive against heretofore
neglected targets in smaller German towns-"relatively virgin areas," in the words of an

°

American planner. 11 CLARION spilled over into Switzerland with ugly results. According to
an Air Force investigation, planes from the 8th and 15th air forces, flown by inexperienced
crews, encountered bad weather over Germany, became "confused" and strayed over
northeastern Switzerland. Confronted with "diminishing fuel supply and bombs still aboard,".:;
they dropped their payloads, "believing they could not fall on Swiss soil. "111 In fact, twelve
different locations in Switzerland were struck, resulting in at least twenty deaths, a considerable
number of injuries and substantial property damage; particularly hard hit were Stein-am-Rhein
and Neuhausen in the canton of Schaffhausen.
One of President Franklin Roosevelt's closest advisers, Lauchlin Currie, was caught, to
his surprise and embarrassment, in Operation CLARION. A New Deal economist, Currie had
been appointed by Roosevelt at the end of 1944 to lead an Anglo-American delegation to
Switzerland to negotiate a shrinking of Swiss economic relations with Germany-.- a reduction of
Swiss exports to the Reich, restrictions on transit traffic-between Germany and Italy and
limitations on the supply of hydroelectric power to both Axis nations. Currie's modest title of
administrative assistant to the president belied his importance.

Representing Roosevelt in

negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek in 1942, Currie carried a personal letter from the president,
informing the Chinese leader that he, Currie, had "my complete confidence [and] access to me

109
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11
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at all times." 112 Many Swiss feared that Currie would assume a dictatorial posture in the
negotiations--the "Currie served to Bern will be hot and concentrated," one Swiss newspaper
quipped 113--but the American emissary proved to be mild and conciliatory.
The Anglo-American delegation presented its credentials in Bern on February 12. At the
ceremonies the leader of the British delegation, Dingle Foot, expressed his relief at having
escaped the din of the constant air raid sirens in London, to which a Swiss minister, Walter
Stucki, "somewhat jokingly" replied with a request that Foot ask Currie "to arrange for the
bombers to leave us in peace at least for the duration of the negotiations," his point being, a
Swiss newspaper explained to its readers, that there were more air raid alarms in neutral Bern
than in the beleaguered British capital. 114
·

On February 22, as Operation CLARION unfolded, Currie and a group of his colleagues

made an official visit to Schaffhausen, stopping at Zurich on the way. Present in the American
delegation was Allen Dulles, whose activities in Bern as the United States' O.S.S. representative
were an open secret.

Curiously enough, shortly before Dulles became Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) director in the postwar period, Currie was denounced as a Communist and fled
the United States for South America where Dulles's agents kept him under surveillance. The
activities of the American Air Force on February 22 literally came close to wrecking Currie's
goodwill visit, for according to a Geneva newspaper, the American party was "almost hit by
their own compatriots' bombs" on their way to Schaffhausen. 115 Escorted by Mayor Bringolf,
Currie and his associates visited the mass grave of the victims of the April 1 bombing and paid
their respects by laying a wreath. They then toured the damaged portions of the city and_visited
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the still charred Allerheiligen Museum, where Bringolf, in a shrewd act of psychological
gamesmanship, arranged a reception. In officially greeting his guests, Bringolf asked them to
use their influence to prevent bombings of the kind that were occurring in the vicinity of
Schaffuausen even as they spoke. 116

A chastened Currie promised, in his response, to

intercede with President Roosevelt as soon as possible to stop the attacks.
Currie cabled Roosevelt when he returned to Bern, asking the president to take action to
spare the Swiss further agony. It is difficult to assess the impact of this cable but it is probably
no accident that on February 24, 1945, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew issued a press
release, announcing that he was "profoundly shocked and distressed" at the "series of bombings
and strafing of Swiss towns on February 22," that on February 26, General Marshall, always
sensitive to Switzerland's plight, ordered General Eisenhower to do something "towards
preventing a recurrence of these incidents," and that two days later Eisenhower "issued orders
to the Tactical Air Forces prohibiting attacks under visual conditions on any objective within 10
miles of the Swiss frontier and under instrument conditions within 50 miles. "117
The attacks of February 22 produced in Swiss newspapers another round of denunciations
of the geographical ignorance of American pilots and of complaints that the Swiss were weary
of promises that were constantly undercut by the actions of the American military. "Words are
cheap," snapped Der Bund, "actions count and convince. "118 The frustration of the Swiss with
their inability to prevent the violation of their neutrality surfaced in sharp questions about the
inactivity of the country's armed forces.

"Where is the Swiss ·air defense?" became an

embarrassing question. That the United States was in danger of depleting its fund of goodwill
in Switzerland was illustrated by the Basel National Zeitung which declared with resignation that
"All sympathy for the large sister republic notwithstanding,·we find it difficult that the liberation
of Europe is accompanied with suffering and death brought so indiscriminately by American

116
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flyers over the border into Switzerland. " 119
In laying prohibitions on the tactical air forces ·o n February 28, General Eisenhower
assured General Marshall that the attacks on Switzerland were "a matter of extreme concern to
this Headquarters and the Air Force," but warned that it might be impossible to stop the
violation of Swiss air space by 2.dministrative fiat.

"Under existing conditions," cautioned

Eisenhower, "there can be no positive guarantee that such incidents will not occur. . . . "120
. Eisenhower's apprehensions were prophetic because within a week of his statement, on March
4, 1945, American B-24 bombers struck two of Switzerland's major cities, Basel and Zurich.
These raids were the proverbial last straw, for they aroused the American high command to take
quick and decisive action to end, once and for all, the air attacks on Switzerland.
The bombing of Basel and Zurich was a less lethal reprise of the raid on Schaftbausen:
some of the same Air Force units participated; they were disoriented by bad weather; plagued
by the unreliability of high-tech equipment; and bombed only when the clouds beneath them
suddenly broke. Making the resemblance between the raids still more uncanny, one American
unit recogniz.ed at the last moment that it was over the wrong target and refrained from dropping
its bombs. One significant difference between the attacks was that by March 1945 American
commanders were holding pilots to a higher level of performance and were less willing than
their predecessors to accept equipment failures as excuses for navigational errors. The leader
of the· American formation that attacked Zurich was, in fact, courtmartialed but acquitted for
negligence.
The March 4 mission .was planned as an assault against German jet aircraft production
facilities and airfields. All three of the 8th Air Force's divisions, a total of 990 B-24s, were
scheduled to participate. One additional combat wing, the 96th, consisting of the 458th, 466th
and 467th bombardment groups, had been added to the Second Division's other wings--the 2nd,
14th, and 20th--that had flown against Ludwigshafen on April 1, 1944. Unlike the April 1 raid,

119

February 23, 1945.

12

°Eisenhower to Marshall, February 28, 1945, Record Group 331, SHAEF, 373.5, National
Archives.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol31/iss1/4

38

et al.: Full Issue

38

on March 4, 1945, the 14th Combat Wing had its full complement of bombardment groups, the
491st having been added to the 44th and 392nd. 121
The weather over the English coast, the usual assembly point for American bombers
headed to Europe, was so bad on March 4 that the Second Division was ordered to fly to the
continent and assemble northeast of Paris. 122 From there it was to proceed to a point south
of Strasbourg, then go directly east to Freiburg, fly southeast again in the direction of Lake
Constance, then tum north, northeast and overfly Stuttgart. From Stuttgart the division was
ordered to continue in a north, northeasterly direction. Along the course the 20th Combat Wing
was assigned to attack an airfield at Schwabisch Hall. The 2nd and 96th combat wings were to
proceed to the Wiirzburg area to attack airfields at Kitzingen and Giebelstadt; the 14th was then
directed to tum to the northwest to attack a tank depot at Aschaffenburg near Frankfurt. 123
The weather on the continent was, if anything, worse than over the English coast: solid
clouds up to 24,000 feet and dense, persistent haze and undercast, described by pilots as 10/10,
meaning the downward vision was 100 percent obscured. As on April 1, 1944, the Second
Division had the sensation of flying in a tunnel, with no visibility above or below. As the
division flew east from Paris, the entire 2nd Combat Wing, some sixty B-24s, abandoned the
mission, 124 as the 446th Bombardment Group had done on April 1, 1944, because the planes
could not see each other well enough to fly in formation. The division's other wings continued
eastward, flying into increasingly miserable conditions. According to a report filed on March
5, "clouds made adherence to any formation extremely difficult. At times group leaders lost
sight of the groups ahead and squadrons lost sight of their group leaders . . . all available
information indicated that primary targets could not be reached and that targets of opportunity
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should be selected as soon as possible. "125
Since the Second Division was near Stuttgart, it elected to attack that city using "H2X
methods." Clouds over the city were so dense that the division's planes dodged each other as
they maneuvered for their bombing runs.
combat wings was barely averted.

A collision between planes of the 20th and 96th

In taking evasive action the 466th Bombardment Group

became separated from the remainder of the 96th Combat Wing and headed south in the
direction of Freiburg which it decided to attack as a target of opportunity.
approached the target, the H2X in the leader's plane failed.

As the group

The group leader, a Colonel

Jacobowitz, then ordered visual bombing, since a break in the clouds suddenly occurred, as it
had at Schaffhausen. The more Jacobowitz looked at the target area the less certain he was
about its identity, so he ordered his section to close its bomb doors and head back to
England. 126
The leader of the second section of the 466th, which consisted of nine planes--eight B-24s
from the 466th and a stray from the 392nd--was confident that the city below him was Freiburg.
According to a subsequent investigation, "the H2X navigator was the man who positively
identified the target as Freiburg, "127 although as a precaution the section leader checked the
"target identification over with all the people in the aircraft" 121 and they all agreed that
Freiburg was below them. General Spaatz's staff later concluded that the bombing of Basel--for
it was Basel not Freiburg that the second section bombed--"resulted from the using of
instruments that failed during the flight and gave false readings. "129
The bombs of the second section fell on the Swiss railway freight station near downtown
Basel. Seven people were injured and thirty houses were damaged. Swiss authorities estimated
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that approximately sixty five-hundred-pound high explosive bombs struck the freight station
(there were actually seventy-six) as well as one thousand small, stick-type incendiaries, some
of which drifted into the Swiss railway passenger station and started fires there.

American

authorities concluded that "many fortunate circumstances" attended the attack on Basel, the
principal one being that the bombs fe!l on a deserted freight station rather than on the nearby
passenger station •filled with the usual Sunday crowd" of travellers. 130 At least as fortunate
for Basel was that, as at Schafthausen, one squadron of American bombers refrained from
releasing its payload. Colonel Jacobowitz's squadron contained fifteen B-24s, carrying at least
126 five-hundred-pound demolition bombs-thirty-two tons of high explosives--which, if dropped,
might have created a bloodbath at Basel.
Only six B-24s attacked Zurich: a hybrid group of three planes from the 392nd
Bombardment Group, two from the 491st group and one from the 445th.13 1 In command of
the group was a plane from the 392nd. The B-24s from the 392nd and the 491st participated
with other units of the 14th Combat Wing in the attempt on Stuttgart. The 44th was leading the
14th Combat Wing, the 392nd being in second position (the reverse of the order on April 1,
1944). While maneuvering over Stuttgart, the six-plane squadron became separated from the
44th and, in fact, •from all other formations due to weather and did not have visual contact with
any other units. • 132 Turning to the south, the squadron also intended to attack Freiburg as a
target of opportunity. The H2X equipment in the lead aircraft was "getting very poor returns"
and giving the navigator "downward visibility only. " 133 Worried about his position, the leader
tried to obtain readings from another H2X plane but its equipment was broken. 134 The lead
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°For detailed American accounts of the bombing of Basel, see John A. Lehrs (American
Vice Counsel) to Cordell Hull, March 7, 1945, Record Group 59, 411.54, Nationcµ Archives,
and Col. F. E. Cheatle, report, March 16, 1945, Record Group 165, ibid.
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navigator suddenly saw a break in the clouds and led the section on a bombing run on what was
assumed to be Freiburg.

Hit instead were the northern suburbs of Zurich "between

Schwamendingen and Strickhof."
The area was heavily forested and sparsely populated but five people were, nevertheless,
killed and twelve injured. The American fliers later reported that clouds covered the southern
part of Zurich, including the lake, and that haz.e at ground level obscured their vision. 135
Commenting on the bombing of Zurich, the American air attache in Bern, Colonel F. E. Chittle,
remarked that • considering the proximity to an important and closely settled area in which these
heavy bombs had fallen, it can be considered a very fortunate circumstance that so much of this
potential force was dissipated harmlessly in woods and open fields." 136
American officials reported that the Swiss affected by these latest attacks displayed the
same stoicism as had the citizens of Schaffhausen. According to the American consul at Basel,
the population •preserved throughout an admirable discipline. The people with whom I have
had occasion to talk about this regrettable incident were reticent in any criticism of the Allies
which they may have .felt, advancing instead suggestions that such accidental bombings appear
to be unavoidable in modem warfare." 137 The Swiss media strived to find fresh language to
articulate its familiar complaints. The geographical ignorance of the American military was once
again denounced138 as was the hollowness of American diplomatic professions. The frustration
over Switz.erland' s inability to defend its neutrality and to achieve its aims diplomatically became
even more palpable. •we are simply not in possession of the requisite means of power to give
the necessary weight to our protests," lamented a Zurich newspaper .139 Warning that it was
dangerous "to show the white flag" to "air pirates," the Basler Nachrichten had no suggestions
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about how the country could achieve its objectives. 140 A new element in the press was an
imaginative variation on the conspiracy theory that the United States was deliberately bombing
Swiss cities to punish the country for helping the Nazis. Some Swiss now thought it possible
that the Soviet Union, which was in the midst of a public relations campaign against their
country, might have orchestrated the raids which, it was thought, could have been concocted at
the Big Three meeting at Yalta. 141
The March 4 raids incensed Currie whose credibility they impaired. Currie's assurances
after the bombings of February 22 that he would prevent their recurrence by personally
intervening with President Roosevelt received the widest publicity in Switzerland. "We hope,"
a Geneva newspaper taunted Currie on March 5, that "he is not waiting to return to the United
States to do this. "142 Whether Currie was spurred to action by such reproaches is not clear,
b~t on March 5 the irrepressible envoy sent cables to both Generals Eisenhower and Marshall
calling their attention to the attacks on Basel and Zurich. "I can not urge too strongly," Currie
entreated the generals, "that the Allied Air Forces be impressed that every possible precaution
be taken to avoid these accidents . . . violations of neutrality and loss of Swiss lives create most
painful impression. You might also want to -consider the advisability of making public statement
which I am sure would help situation here. "143
Currie's pleas were unnecessary because the attacks of March 4 exhausted the patience
of the American high command and produced immediate, decisive action. Spaatz's superior,
General Arnold, denounced the bombings as a "blunder," caused by "aggressive, but sometimes
careless leaders. "144

General Marshall was "personally concerned about the recurrent,
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accidental bombings of Swiss territory" 145 and issued the following order to General
Eisenhower on·March 5: "Spaatz to report to Switzerland to clear up Bombing Mishaps. "146
The next day Spaatz received an urgent, top secret cable from Marshall's headquarters,
amplifying his orders: "the successive bombings of Swiss territory now demand more than
expressions of regret. It is desired that ,·ou personally leave immediately for Geneva or such
other place as may be necessary and present to the appropriate Swiss officials first hand
information as to the causes of these incidents, the corrective action undertaken, and a formal
apology. . . . No publicity and maximum secrecy." 147 If this order had the ring of a rebuke,
it was intended to be one.
Spaatz was immersed in planning what the American. generals hoped would be the
decisive thrust against Germany and could not have relished taking enforced leave to travel to
Switzerland, but he complied with his orders with alacrity. Accompanied by his chief of staff,
General E. P. Curtis, Spaatz flew to Lyons on March 7 and traveled by automobile to Bern,
arriving there at 7:00 p.m. the same evening. At nine o'clock the next morning Spaatz and his
party presented themselves at the Federal Palace and were received by a Swiss delegation that

included Minister of War Karl Kobelt, Foreign Minister Petit-Pierre, General Henri Guisan, Air
Force Commander Rihner and others. 141 On behalf of the War Department and the United
States Strategic Air Forces, Spaatz "expressed to the Minister of War our official and my
personal regrets for these incidents and particularly for the Swiss lives which had been lost as
a result." In a working group with his Swiss military counterparts, Spaatz explained the specific
steps he had taken on March 6 to eliminate the bombing of Swiss territory.

He had, he

revealed, drawn two lines around Switzerland. Within the first line, roughly fifty miles north
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of the Rhine, extending from Strasbourg to Innsbruck, no attacks could henceforth be made
without specific permission from Spaatz himself. Within a second line, drawn one hundred
miles north of the first, clearance to bomb "by other than absolutely visual means" must be
obtained from Spaatz's headquarters.

Spaatz also disclosed General Eisenhower's order of

February 28 to the tactical air forces, forbidding them to attack any target within ten miles of
the Swiss border and to attack "only after positive identification in a zone extending 10 miles

to 50 miles.·"
According to Spaatz, General Guisan and Air Force Commander Rihner seemed to be
"more than satisfied with the steps which had been taken and assured me that information with
regard to the prohibited zone would be kept strictly confidential."

Spaatz responded by

cautioning the Swiss that if the Germans learned of the sanctuary around the Swiss border and
began to exploit it, he might be compelled to order new attacks. The Swiss military leaders
raised other issues with Spaatz. They indicated "very strongly their desire to obtain 10 P-51s
from the Air Force. "149 Evidently, they did not intend to use them to shoot down American
bombers, for Spaatz supported their request on the grounds that granting it would generate
goodwill for the United States.

The War _Department declined to accommodate the Swiss,

however, because the supply of P-51s was inadequate for pressing American needs. 150 The
Swiss also reminded Spaatz that they were repairing and maintaining downed American planes
and could pay for the P-51s by deducting their purchase price from the maintenance bill which
they would present the United States at some future date. Finally, the Swiss stated that they
would paint even larger crosses at their borders as signals to errant aircraft.
Spaatz informed Marshall's headquarters that the "attitude of all of the Swiss authorities
was very understanding and even cordial. They seemed to be genuinely impressed with our
visit."

"To impress public opinion with the efforts being made by the Americans to avoid

further difficulties," the Swiss asked for and received Spaatz's permission to issue a
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communique, discussing in general terms the results of his mission. 151 This they did at a press
conference on the evening of March 8, as Spaatz was returning to France.1 52 War Minister
Kobelt presided at the press conference and thanked Spaatz for coming to Switzerland "in spite
of his heavy duties." Kobelt reported that Spaatz had expressed his regrets over the recent
bombings and had assured the Swiss that he "would immediately make new arrangements to
assure the security of our country and had ordered even more effective steps to be taken,"
although what those steps were Kobelt did not disclose. The minister assured his countrymen
that "henceforth the situation will improve," which it did. After Spaatz's visit there were no
more bombings of Switzerland. 153
Currie did not participate in the meeting of March 8. He was, in fact, preparing to
return to the United States, because he had concluded his negotiations on March 5, having
obtained the agreement of Switzerland to reduce its economic ties with Germany. That Spaatz
appeared in Bern three days after the conclusion of Currie's negotiation proves that the general's
mission was not designed to assist Currie by offering military concessions to procure economic
objectives. The motive for Spaatz's mission was the need for the American military to salvage
its professional pride, for the persistent bombings of Switzerland were a standing reproach

to

the competence of the American Air Force which exposed itself to the world as an organi7.ation
apparently unable to implement its own policies vis-~-vis neutrals.
The missions of Spaatz and Currie augured well for the future of Swiss-American
relations. Spaatz's visit was received with "deep appreciation" by the Swiss government and
seems to have had "the most beneficial effect on public opinion. "154 The Swiss press also
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welcomed the general's initiative. Spaatz, the Gaz.ette de Lausanne asserted on March 10, had
"demonstrated in a preemptory manner that the American military attributes ·the greatest
importance to the bombing question." Currie's negotiations were also considered by the Swiss
to have turned out well. Swiss neutrality had emerged "unscathed," the Neue Zurcher 7£itung
remarked approvingly, m and many Swiss now looked forward to a western r~rientation of
the nation's economics and politics. Currie was praised for practicing a kind of shirt sleeves
diplomacy in which he sought out the views of ordinary Swiss people and learned, so it was
hoped, that they were not pro-Fascist, as some had represented them to be.
Currie did not disappoi,nt Swiss expectations, for he reported to Marshall and Eisenhower
that he found the Swiss to be "overwhelmingly pro-Ally. " 156 _Was Currie merely hearing the
transient enthusiasm of people impressed by the impending Anglo-American military victory--an
everyone loves a winner euphoria--or was he recording an attitude toward the United States that
had deeper roots? Consider in this regard Minister Kobelt' s remarks to General Spaatz at the
opening of the March 8 meeting, when he told the general that "we are proud to be considered
the oldest democracy of the world together with the United States. "157

Or consider the

declaration of a highly placed Swiss Red Cross official to Minister Harrison on November 10,
1944, which was said to represent the "opinion of a great many Swiss citizens": "Switzerland .
has a close affinity with his own [President Roosevelt's] country from the viewpoint of the
constitution and of the fundamental principles of her home organization. "158 Although these
remarks might be dismissed as flattery calculated to establish a rapport with representatives of
an emerging superpower--as the cynical dusting off the words of a long forgotten hymn--the
readiness of Swiss officials to invoke them suggests that the traditional concept of the sister
republics still had sufficient influence in Switzerland to sustain a bias toward the United States
strong enough, as Currie discovered, to survive the_ fiery ordeal of American aerial
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bombardment.
The end of the war in Europe in June 1945 did not close the curtain on the American
bombing of Switzerland, for a final accounting of the damages had to be made and, more
challenging, the American Congress had to be persuaded to pay the bill when it was presented.
After the war the United States sent investigators to Switzerland to authenticate Swiss claims and
by the spring of 1947 most claims had been resolved to the satisfaction of all parties. The State
Department, therefore, requested Congress to authorize an interim indemnity payment of ten
million dollars, a payment that was to be distributed to the bombing victims as well as to those
whose property had been damaged by the crashing of disabled American planes (forty-six
incidents amounting to one-sixtieth of the bombardment indemnity). 159 The State Department's
bill passed the Senate and was sent to the House of Representatives, where it was favorably
reported to the floor by the Foreign Relations Committee.

The full House failed to act,

however, with the result that the Swiss Compensation Bill languished in Congress for the next
two years.
In July 1947 the State Department urged Congress to pass the bill, "since certain sections
of the Swiss press and individuals in Parliament are always eager to enlarge upon any slight
dissent between that country and the United States. "160

In September 1947 the Swiss

government (which, having paid some local claims, had become a creditor of the United States)
requested Washington to make "a substantial advance payment" 161 and in October the
Schaffbausen City Council went on record as being dissatisfied with Congress's stalling. The
next summer, as the compensation bill continued to be immobiliz.ed in the House of
Representatives, Swiss commentary became sharper.

Mayor Bringolf wrote an article in a

Schaffhausen newspa~r in which he complained that "with the best of understanding for the
frequent cumbersomeness of parliamentary machinery in a democracy, we find ourselves forced
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to voice our amarement and disappointment over the incomprehensible dragging out by the
American parliament of an affair of such importance to us. " 162 The editor of Zurich's Die Tat
was even more exercised, charging that "these delaying tactics on the part of the American
Representatives can hardly be qualified as anything but a deliberately unfriendly act towards
Switzerland. "163 What was particularly galling to Switzerland was that through the Marshall
Plan the American Congress was lavishing billions of dollars on neighboring European nations
even as it was refusing "to settle what the Swiss consider to be a just debt of a few
millions. " 164
In May 1949 the House of Representatives finally came to grips with the "Swiss Bombing
Claims" bill and was treated to some remarkably unedifying floor debate. Congressman Stephen
Young, Democrat of Ohio, assailed the Swiss as "callous and hard; cunning and cold blooded,
and always looking out for their own interests and seeking an unfair advantage." "They plotted
World War I in Switzerland," Congressman Young complained, and "the Swiss became rich out
of World War I. World War Il was plotted there, and the Swiss became wealthy from World
War II while we were expending our blood and treasure. " 165 Responding to those "disobliging
remarks," the editor of the Journal de

Geneve on May 13, 1949, professed to be "astonished"

that they could be directed "at a nation which has always felt the most friendly sympathy for the
great American republic."

The anti-Swiss rhetoric made little impression on the House,

however. It passed the bill and sent it on to the Senate and, after the interest on the claims was
reduced from 5 percent to 3 1/2 percent, the bill became law on June 28, authorizing a payment
to Switzerland of up to $16,000,000. On October 21, 1949, more than five and one half years
after the bombing of Schaffhausen, Switzerland accepted SF62,176,433.06 in discharge of her
claims. In so far as money could compensate Switzerland for the damage inflicted upon her,
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a settlement had at last been achieved.
The bombing of Switzerland by the United States during World War II was a tragedy.
At least seventy Swiss citizens were killed and considerably more were hurt and maimed. The
bombings were also a tragedy for the American crews who participated in them, crews that were
sent aloft in impossible weather with unreliab!e equipment to attack unreachable targets. The
grief of American fliers when they learned after the fact that they had bombed Schaffbausen was
deep and genuine. Some airmen, the New York Times reported, were "too distressed to talk"
while others could only murmur that they were •terribly sorry that this could have
happened.• 166 American anguish was particularly sharp because of the widespread goodwill
towards Switzerland at all levels of American society, including at the highest ranks of the
military.

The Swiss grossly underestimated the breadth of American esteem because they

mistook the strident voices of a few shortsighted bureaucrats and parochial politicians for the
opinion of the American public at large.
The attitude of the Swiss toward the United States during and after World War II appears
to follow a similar pattern. From the 1930s onward a vocal minority of Swiss criticized the
United States, often from an ideological stance that held it to embody the worst features of
modem capitalism. But the majority of Swiss were well disposed toward the United States and
their sentiments survived the provocations of the· American Air Force during the war and the
hectoring of a few American politicians after it. It may seem naive and sentimental to ascribe
Swiss goodwill to a shared institutional heritage that is captured by the sister republics metaphor,
but skeptics about the power of metaphors and symbols are obliged to produce an alternative
explanation for the persistence of Swiss-American friendship through the dark days of 1944 and
1945, a persistence that fifty years after the fact appears to be an extraordinary testimony to the
power of common democratic ideals.
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